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1. Introduction 
Wherever financial institutions take deposits, it seems, governments provide sorne form of 
deposit insurance. In many countries (United States or the European Union members) this backing 
is formal and explicito EIsewhere, insurance is simply an understanding that the government will not 
allow depositors to lose their savings. Depositors are supposedly less informed than the financial 
institutions and small investors, in particular, are very ofien financially unsophisticated. As a response 
to this problem of asymmetric information, under sorne circumstances and up to a certain amount, 
a deposit insurance guarantee [DIO from now on] is provided. 
Traditionally, banks have provided a safe depository for savers and for many years banking 
was a comfortable and profitable oligopoly with limited room to maneuver, but with predictable 
earnings. Banks, although risky, have a unique position in the economy: a loss of confidence in the 
banking system can lead to a flight from deposits to cash and a credit crunch that has the potential 
to turn a mild recession into a downward economic spiral that feeds on itself. The deposit insurance 
schemes prevent the deepening of financial weakness and economic recession, by protecting financial 
institutions from runs and the payment system as a whole. Nevertheless, its microeconomic and global 
objectives complement each other: when the savers are protected, the financial system is indirectly 
also protected. 
To reconcile the "saver protection systems" the European Union regulation passed in May 
1994 (Directive 94/19/EC) helps to simplify the working of individual markets by allowing the credit 
companies of the European Community to offer services in a restriction-free environment. This 
regulation attempts to set up a European system for minimal bank deposit protection in case of 
insolvency. Member States [MS from now on] will have to adapt to it by 1999, following a transitory 
period of five years. 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss and analyse the different aspects of the deposit 
insurance, the harmonisation of the schemes and their compatibility with other Community regulations 
regarding the start up of the third stage of the European Monetary System (EMS). 
Afier this introduction, in section two, the foundations of an efficient deposit insurance 
scheme, widely developed by doctrine, are addressed afier studying the problem of asymmetric 
information and moral-hazard, as well as the "agency-theory". Section three is dedicated to the 
explanation of the Community's norms linked with banking supervision and deposit insurance, 
developing principally the changes to be introduced in different schemes of the Member State 
countries. Section four presents the schemes of Deposit Insurance of the countries that now are in the 
EU. Finally, a summary is provided in section five. 
2. Deposit insurance foundations 
The existence of DI must allow the operations of the financial sector to be conducted in a 
freely competitive environment and with the assignment of efficient resources, so that, in principie, 
all depositors will be indifferent to the alternative of depositing their savings in a public or private 
institution, large or small, national or foreign, etc. 
The cover mechanism may also suppose an increase in the incentives for the appearance of 
an excessively risky banking or credit activity that operates against the protection or safety of 
deposits, moving the financial cost to the depositors, to the insurer or to society as a whole (the 
designated problem of "moral-hazard"). 
In the absence of DI, only the public entities can count on "implicit" state support and the 
large credit entities on the guarantee of being "too big to faH". Since DI is a basic pillar to reach the 
stability of the system, its main characteristics will be analyzed: 
2.1. Public or private nature and subscription system 
When the subscription system is voluntary, the entities not included in it, even though they 
do not incur the cost of the premium, nevertheless should face the payment of higher interest rates 
to attract savings. In this manner the problem outlined by the agents who participate in the system's 
benefits without contributing to the same (free-rider problem) is reduced. When the subscription is 
obligatory, the possibility of this opportunistic behaviour is reduced, thus the election of the 
depository entity amongst those who adhere to the system, and those who do not, can lead to 
discrimination that can affect the stability of the financial system forming structures in the banking 
sector that will be generally over-concentrated with an average dimension too big, in general, for the 
needs of depositors and competition. 
Government intervention in the DI system must be understood as an additional means to 
guarantee the operation and integrity of the financial system and to protect the depositors. State 
intervention, although extended to all the industrialized countries, is debatable in terms of economic 
efficiency. This objective can be equally reached by letting the market act by means of the formation 
of mutuals or consortiums(l) [Chamorro et al. 1994:32]. However, financial insolvency, that finds 
its origins in macro and micro-economic changes, produces chain effects, so that in the opinion of 
Merton and Bodie [1992] what is optimum "ex-ante" (e.g.: non intervention) cannot be "ex-post" 
(when there is already a crisis). Nevertheless, the building up of technical reserves involves, in any 
case, high opportunity costs for the guarantors. 
2.2. Funetions of the insurer organization and relationship to other authorities 
The establishment of limits of protection and the supervision of the interest parties are 
mechanisms directed to reduce the prob1ems of "moral-hazard". 
One answer to this problem is to combine DI with vigorous banking regulations which broadly 
involves two kinds of objectives: i) systemie stability of the financial system, which includes, among 
other characteristics, avoiding the payment and settlement risks on regulated banks and associated 
financial institutions, and ii) investor proteetion (limited insurance). The limits on the amount to be 
insured give larger, and therefore more sophisticated depositors, an incentive to monitor bankers' 
behaviour, although regulation manages risks more directly, by forbidding, or making more costly, 
certain kinds of lending [Shoenmaker: 1992a]. 
Both competitive distortions and an increase in financial fragility will occur under the present 
directive due to sorne well-known problems induced by asymmetric information and moral-hazard 
[Grossman, 1992:802; Berlin, et al., 1991:747]. The minimum level of coverage should not be too 
high to deter the depositors from being virtually indifferent to the soundness of their credit 
institutions. The pricing and funding procedures of deposit insurance schemes are crucial factors in 
this situation. 
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Asymmetric information and adverse selection are amongst the main consequences of high 
transaction costs in the financial markets (the costs of gathering information and monitoring 
behaviour). Bank runs should not be irrational outbreaks but perfectly rational responses to lack of 
information, since it is costly for outsiders to obtain accurate information about the bank's financial 
conditions. 
In order to neutralize, or at least minimize, the moral-hazard problems there are several 
instruments that shareholders, insurers or depositors may use: to monitor the behaviour of tile insured 
party by the insurer; to adjust the insurance premium according to that behaviour; to require the 
insured party to avoid risky activities. However, the objectives of these groups are very different; 
while the shareholders want to maximize the value of the firm assuming its limited responsibility, 
depositors (and insurers) want the money to be in a safe institution, whether profitable or not, in the 
long runo 
In the conceptual framework of the "agency-theory", DI can be envisaged as a set of financial 
contracts. The contracts between depositors, internal and external shareholders under the direction 
of the company, and the insurer, originate a conflict of interest in addition to that already existing due 
to the separation of property and control. The agency-theory struggles with the minimization of the 
costs derived from the "agency's relationships" between agent and principal. 
In the presence of DI, the role of the principal falls back on the shareholders, bondholders, 
depositors and the insuring body, while the credit entity is the agent. The external shareholders --who 
have limited responsibility-- have as a principal objective the maximization of the value of the 
company and, consequently, their profitability. Internal shareholders' objectives are not always, 
however, of a pecuniary nature, but also of control and the exercise of power. Depositors aspire to 
maximize profitability and to minimize risk and, in the absence of DI, they will demand adequate 
compensation --premium risk-- in accordance with a risk level derived of the operations of the credit 
entity. But in the presence of DI, the risk factor is moved to the insurer, this being so, the credit 
entity will have the principal interest in observing the behaviour of the assured. 
The protection of the interests of the internal and external shareholders, savers and 
bondholders is achieved through control activities --including supervision costs-- internal audit looks 
out for the interest of the internal shareholders; while external audit protects the interests of the 
external shareholders and bondholders. In any case the conflict of interest does not disappear for those 
who have contracted the supervision services. In the presence of DI the tasks of supervision are 
shared by the insurer --who is in fact the one who assumes the direct cost of the insolvency-- and the 
Central Bank, which in addition to responsibilities for the monetary policy, is the lender's last resort. 
2.3. Deposit insurance coverage 
Far from protecting the system, the existence of DI permits banking insolvency situations 10 
arise in the market because of the risky performance of the assured entity. A partial DI (coinsurance) 
compels the depositors to sustain part of the losses derived as a consequence of banking insolvency 
[McKenzie, 1994: 172-78]. 
Concerning the coverage's reach, that is, if the coverage is based on the consideration of 
individual deposits or comprises all the operations carried out by the depositor, we will see that the 
system is more efficient in the latter case. If the scope of the coverage were by deposits, the large 
saver would have access to a guarantee diversifying his deposits in different credit entities, so that, 
in the case of one or the ather's insalvency where he has his savings, he would collect the maximum 
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guaranteed as many times as he has deposits in each entity, being a value exceeding the maximum 
limit covered, a cost that is transmitted to the insurer. While, if the scope of the coverage is by the 
depositor, he will only collect this covered maximum limit once. 
2.4. The valuation 01 the premium 
The valuation of the premium to be paid by the insurer may be the most relevant aspect of 
deposits security, even more so, when the credit entities enjoy limited responsibility. The 
determination of an economic and socially "fair" premium has been one of the most analyzed and 
contrasted aspects of DI. The research done up to now [Dermine, 1992: 1-2] has been developed from 
Black and Scholes' innovative work [1973] on the valuation of options. Thus, initially Merton [1977, 
1978], and later Pennachi [1987], Allen and Saunders [1987] amongst others, applied the mentioned 
model for the valuation of DI. 
Merton analyzed the existing relationship between the guarantee of the deposits and a 
European put-option. Pyle [1986], Ronn and Yerma [1988] used this, as a basis work to determine 
the needs of capital; while Gorton and Santomero [1990] applied it to the evaluation of the 
premium-risk of the underlying debt of the banks. 
Amongst the most outstanding empirical projects are those of Marcus and Shaked [1984], who 
carried out a study in which they applied Merton's model to a sample of 40 banks in order to 
determine if the premium value imposed by the FDIC was approximated to the theoretical value of 
the coverage premium [Tasca, 1992:46]. Although applying a fair valuation model of the assets of 
depository entities does not imply that the same result would retlect the insolvency situation in case 
the entity had its yields reduced by bad management [Chamorro, 1993:94-95]. Ronn and Yerma 
[1986] accomplished "various transverse or interbanking comparisons", that is to say, determined if 
the premium providing the funds of the DI was in conformity with the solvency levels of the 
depository institutions. McCulloch [1984] and Crouhy and Galai [1986, 1991] created a model for 
the transformation of the role of banks and calculated a sensitive-risk premium for interest rates. 
Dermine [1992] analysed the deposit premium of sensitive insurances, and also, the commercial-risk. 
In the ineftlcient determination of the premium levels, several problems, such as moral­
hazard, adverse selection, and equity links may be considered [Chamorro, et al., 1994; Suárez B. de 
Quirós, 1993], since: 
a.- The banking entities that count on the support of DI can accomplish high risk investment 
operations. For the deposits to be assured, the entity obtains funds at, generally, lower costs than they 
would have in the absence of insurance and, in the event of insolvency, [Garrido, 1991:35] "the sum 
or part of the assured responsibility of its clients is moved to the insurer entity". Furthermore, when 
positive results are obtained as a consequence of risky behaviour, those will be for their own entity; 
while, if as a consequence of such behaviour it descends into an insolvency situation, the system turns 
normally, to its defense, in particular when it is considered a large entity. 
b.- The contribution criteria of the guarantee deposit fund with uniform rates involve an "equity" 
problem. If the contribution is carried out in the function of the solvency levels of credit entities, the 
problem subsists, although a fair redistribution of the yields is reached. Larger credit entities have 
a smaller insolvency probability since they are better trained to diversify the risk. Nevertheless, in 
the event of insolvency the system will come to its defense covering all their creditors, while, when 
the insolvency of small entities is considered, the most viable option can be their liquidation, covering 
only the assured deposits and excluding part of their creditors. Moreover, with asole premium system 
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where the reparation cost of the larger credit entities falls, totally or in part, in the guarantee system, 
the small entities are subsidizing the large ones. However, if we consider two entities of a similar 
size, the one having financially prudent behaviour contributes to the guarantee deposit fund that 
operates as subsidies to those adopting a risky behaviour, since in the event of insolvency, both will 
be protected by the system. 
A possible solution may be found in the application of different premium rates according to 
the risk level of the operations undertaken by the credit entities: a system applied in the US since 
1993. The FDIC [McKenzie, 1994: 177-78] replaced the sole premium for all financial entities applied 
until 1992, by a premium system related to risk levels. The banks were classified according to their 
capitalization level: well-capitalized, adequately-capitalized or infra-capitalized. At the same time each 
bank's category was divided according to the supervisory level to which each is submitted: A 
(secure), B (under supervision) and C (under strict supervision), so that a high ratio of capital in 
relationship to the assets involves a smaller insolvency probability and consequently a smaller 
probability of using the funds for guaranteeing deposits. In this manner the system gives incentives 
to banks to be well capitalized. 
2.5. Deposit Insurancefinandng systems 
In the opinion of Revell [1985] and Garrido [1991], two DI financing for DI systems 
standout. (i) Funds financed with anticipated and periodic contributions from beneficiaries used in the 
event of insolvency. McCarthy [1980] estimated that this system counts amongst its principal 
advantages that of transmitting confidence to the savers and the knowledge that the existence of a fund 
guarantees the refund of their deposits. The main disadvantage is derived in the difficulties of 
calculating the amount of the deposit insurance fund in the light of the impossibility to determine 
future insolvency situations. Within this financing system one must differentiate the mechanisms 
according to the moment of intervention: those which act before the statement of liquidation, assuring 
the continuity of the entity, and those which may act afterwards. (H) Mutual coverage funds or those 
that perform "ex-post"; that is, which operate in the event of difficulties in one of the associated 
banks, when specific contributions are undertaken. The drawback this system presents is that it should 
be accomplished by disbursements for all the associates at critical times, when a generalized 
insolvency problem exists. 
3. Banking supervision and deposit insurance 
The Community regulation tends to create a freely competitive environment; in that sense, 
the harmonisation norms of DI have been preceded by others with similar importance such as (i) the 
liberalization of the movement of capital (Directive 88/3611EEC, 24 June); (H) the authorization of 
branch entity operations in all the MS (Second Directive of Banking Coordination, 89/646/EEC, 15 
December) and, finally (iH) measures related to the supervision of credit entities (Directive March, 
1993; Directive December, 1989 relative to the solvency coefficient; Directive April, 1992, which 
amongst other things, makes the supervision fall back on the authority of the MS of origin which 
authorizes the development of activities; and Directive December, 1992 on the control of very risky 
operations) . 
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3.1. The Community regulation on banking supervision. 
Finds its origin principal1y in the Basle Concordat [Group of Ten; 1975]. The supervision 
tasks of the credit entities rnight be shared between the horne country authorities, which are 
responsible for the solvency supervision, and the host country authorities, which are responsible for 
the liquidity entity supervision. 
On the other hand, the Second Cornrnunity Directive, that carne into effect on the 1st of 
January, 1993, al10ws any credit entity to rnove freely in any MS. The rnornent the credit entity has 
received authorization frorn the horne country, (single banking licence) it can work in its horne or host 
country, and apply the sarne principies of the Agreernent of Basle. A close col1aboration between the 
different supervisory authorities of both countries is needed, which can be reached by bilateral 
agreernents. 
The application of horne country principie for the supervision of the credit entity responds to 
a logical consequence of the headquarter's, ultirnate responsibility for the proper functioning of al1 
the entities and their dependencies; in practice, this is not easy to apply. Therefore, according to the 
Annual Report of the European Monetary Institute, 1994, [1995; pp. 92-94] the application of the 
Second Cornrnunity Directive could be cornplicated in certain situations: 
i) Crisis. In a crisis situation, aH credit entities present in different MS, should count on a set of 
principies which would help the supervisors of the horne countries to coordinate the tlow of 
inforrnation and aH supervisors actions. To accornplish this, the horne country supervisor would be 
the "chief supervisor" of the host countries. 
ii) Insolvency. In the sarne way, in the situation of insolvency, aH credit entities present in different 
MS, could find thernselves facing different problerns: if the liquidation is initiated by a bank present 
in the MS, the different judicial rneasures and insolvency procedures applied in each MS create 
difficulties for the coordination of the supervisory action due to: 
1.	 The lack of consistency between the horne country principie for the precautionary supervision 
of the branches and the host country legislation for the application of the insolvency 
procedures. 
That is, if the supervisors of the EU countries, as authorities of the host country, can not have 
equal facilities to start a procedure against a foreign branch bank, this represents an obstacle 
to the coordination activities of the supervisors of other MS. 
2.	 The possibility of the insolvency procedures started against a host bank being recognized in 
those countries where the bank has branches. 
3.	 The possible existence of different liquidation systerns that irnply different treatrnents given 
to the assets (systerns based on the universality or on the territory) that involves the EU 
depositors discrirnination. 
As a consequence of those aspects, the Cornrnittee of Governors irnpeHed a harrnonisation rneasure 
of Cleaning-up and Liquidation so that insolvency can be treated the sarne in different MS. countries. 
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3.2. Community Directive, application's effects and reforms ro be introduced 
The proposal for the harmonisation of DI in the EU dates back to 1986, when the 
Commission of the European Communities issued a Recommendation (22 December) concerning the 
DI systems established in the Community. This same regulation of the DI systems approved their 
irnmediate application where DlS. existed and, the study of the possibility of their creation, where 
they did noto That recommendation gave special attention to the coverage of branch deposits of credit 
entities, whose central headquarters were found in other MS. 
Already, in May 1992, the approval of a directive's proposal to increase the protection of 
bank deposits, was discussed in depth at the European Commission. According to this preliminary 
outline DI had to be obligatory to an harmonised minimum. The norm referred mainly to the 
"principie of the home country", as well as, the limiting of assured depositors and the obligatory 
adhesion to the system and harmonisation of compensation up to 15.000 Ecus(2). Finally, the 
Community approved the Directive 941l9/EC ofthe European Parliament and the Council(3), naming 
a maximum guarantee of 20.000 Ecus per depositor and by credit entity. This regulation underlines 
the "principie of subsidiarity" in the following manner: "the deposit guarantee is a fundamental 
element for the accomplishment of the interior market and an indispensable complement to the credit 
entities' supervision system by the solidarity that is created between all the entities of a common 
financial center, in the event those are found in difficuities". 
The norm regulates very relevant aspects of DI in terms of moral-hazard, asymmetric 
information and supervision problems. The harmonized insurance guarantee pursues both: the system 
and the depositor's protection. 
- Membership: The norm imposes obligatory membership to the DI systems, unless that is accounted 
for by a private equivalent system officially recognized. The opportunist behaviour of agents is 
corrected with this measure. Practically all EU countries rely on obligatory membership mechanisms, 
except for Germany, Belgium, Spain, Italy and Luxembourg, all of which should modify their 
respective systems. 
- Maximum coverage limit: Coverage is assured "up to ECUS 20.000 for the set of deposits of the 
same depositor". Temporarily, when the guarantee does not reach ECUS 20.000, depositors will be 
able to count on only ECUS 15.000. Although this limit will be in effect from 1999, there is a 
transitory period from 1st July, 1995, to the 31st December, 1999, during which the countries that 
have an inferior coverage to 15.000 Ecus, will have to increase their maximum to the stated limito 
When deposits shared by different depositors are considered, these are computed in equal parts 
amongst these different depositors. The regulation has tried not to let an excessive number of 
depositors to be in the minimal protection threshold. 
Those systems that cover deposits at an inferior level as opposed to the established ones, have 
to be increased to bring them up to par with the harmonised minima!. Inversely, when the national 
coverage levels are aboye those of the Community, the latter may be taken as a complement. The 
directive allows the possibility for the MS to establish a coinsurance system [those are the cases of 
Ireland, Portugal, the United Kingdom and Italy] where coverage must be at a minimum of 90%, a 
percentage that can never be inferior to ECUS 20.000. Other countries such as Belgium, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Spain and Portugal should adjust their guarantees in the preliminary stage to ECUS 
15.000. Thereafter, in a second phase and, in addition to these countries, also Austria, Holland and 
the United Kingdom, should adjust their coverage level until they reach ECUS 20.000. Spain will 
have to duplicate the DI in the next five years to reach this amount. 
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- The system in action: The coverage mechanisms operate when, in the judgement of the authorities 
of the financial entity, the restitution of the funds will be impossible, without any chance of achieving 
. it in the short run, or when the judicial authorities may have declared the bankruptcy or the 
insolvency of such an entity. 
By virtue of which judicial measure or administrative procedure (home o host country) will 
the system be in action? Remember what we had said in relation to the cleaning-up and liquidation 
which has to be harmonised to balance the different judicial measures and administrative procedures. 
On the other hand, it could be that one branch is in the procedure of liquidation in accordance with 
the home country norms, but not with the host country norms. 
There are countries that intervene before liquidation [Le. Germany, Belgium, Spain, Finland, 
France, Ireland, Italy and Portugal] while others take action only in the event of liquidation (4). 
- The principIe of "subsidiarity": This is applied when an entity within the same group is found to be 
having difficulties. The method of dealing with this question is, nevertheless, different depending on 
whether there is a branch or a subsidiary involved, thus: 
a.- The "principIe of home-country": In agreement with the Second Community Directive this 
principIe is applied in the case of branches. 
The existence of different levels of deposit guarantees that go beyond the mm¡mum 
harmonised, permits the existence of different compensations (in each MS it would be as many 
systems as there are branches of other entities from other MS, so that the same competitive problems 
will be balanced between domestic and foreign entities. 
-If the home country GD of the branch is lower than the host country GD; the first entity 
might be authorized to adhere to the host country system. It might be relevant to determine 
in which country the complementary fund will be formed. The forming of complementary 
funds in the home country, since branches are in different countries, will mean that difficult, 
technical problems have to be solved(5). If the entity contributes to the host country fund, 
another problem is present: the regulation of which country (home or host) will be used if an 
entity encornters insolvency, the insurance cost is in the host country authority hands, while 
the supervision is in the hands of the home country authority. In this sense the supervisory 
system ofboth countries must be coordinated so that the host country has the guarantee 10 pay 
a compensation to depositors of entities that have not been directly supervised. 
-If the home country GD of the branch is higher than the host country GD during an initial 
period, the host MS countries only will offer (to branch depositors of other MS entities) the 
same level of compensation offered to their depositors (of the host country). 
We can summarize this by saying that the host country principIe is applied for Deposit 
Insurance harmonisation, however for supervisory schemes the home country principIe will be used. 
With respect to the branches of credit entities whose social headquarters are found outside the 
Community, an equivalent coverage to the one that governs in the MS is granted. 
The "principle of the host country" will be applied in the case of subsidiaries. 
[Here chart.l] 
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The different treatment given to branches and subsidiaries together with the different levels 
of access to coverage, may be a distortive factor of competition. The credit entities will choose those 
organizational structures that provide them with greater competitive advantages [McKenzie eL al, 
1994:188]. 
Amongst those aspects not harmonised yet by the current executive body, there are two of 
vital importance that are the subject of discussion for regulators and that affect the efficiency of the 
relationships between the EU and its members countries. These are: 
- Financing methods: The Directive has regulated nothing in this regard, simply advising that the 
financing of the system should fall back on its own credit entities whenever possible; in addition to 
the procuring of the financial capacity of the systems that be proportionate to the obligations that 
pertain to them, without putting in danger the stability of the banking system of the MS as a whole. 
We believe that the norm should be more explicit, harmonising the commissioned organs of the 
managerial fundo This only demonstrates the subsidiary function of the State, which transfers its 
regulating of DI systems, implying additional situations of "rivalry or competition" [Chamorro, et al., 
1994:40]. In insolvency situations, originating mainly in economic crises, if the insurance body is a 
private one, there is a greater probability that there will not be enough economic capacity to protect 
aH depositors. 
France, Germany, Italy and Luxembourg currently count on private DI systems. The rest of 
the countries have systems in which the State has a meaningful participation. Germany, Belgium, 
Denmark, Spain, Finland, Ireland, Portugal and the United Kingdom, count on accumulation funds, 
while, in the remaining countries, the deposit insurance fund is a mutual. 
- Fixed or variable premiums: However, the most argued aspect of DI, has not been harmonised. The 
financing system of DI through participation quotas, fixed or variable has not been specified. The 
establishment of a variable contribution system depending of the risk levels might have permitted 
reaching the proposed objectives more fully. 
Finally, before ending this section we want to point out the possible implications of an 
harmonised deposit insurance system, in the light of a possible unified Central Bank at the third stage 
of the European Monetary System (EMS). 
-The European Central Bank will be the sole responsible entity of the liquidity and solvency of the 
credit entities, as well as the lender of last resort. To urge a financing system for the deposit 
insurance fund according to the different risk levels assumed by the financial entities is a clear need. 
- The final stage includes the setting of permanently fixed exchange parties, the adoption of a single 
currency and the introduction of a common monetary policy set by a central banking institution 
[Johnson, R: 1993]. 
4. European Union Deposit Insurance Schemes 
The existing DI systems show presently a marked national character and a great diversity in 
their different normative aspects [see i.e., Annex Ia,b]. This diversity is explained by the different 
regulatory norms and the way countries understand the problem of banking insolvency. 
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Annex la
 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes in the EU
 
.... 
...	 Membership .....
. Counlry Crealion's Year Leve! of proleelion Level of proleetion 
in ECUs (2)(02/95) 
AUSTRIA 1987 Compu1sory 200.000 Sehillings 15,167 
BELGIUM 1975 Voluntary 550.000 FB 14,215 
DENMARK 1989 Compulsory 250.00 DKR 33,716 
FINLAND 1969 Compulsory Unlimiled 
FRANCE 1980 Compulsory 400.000 FF 61,239 
GERMANY 1966 Voluntary 30 % of the bank' s own funds 
GREECE Al the momenl no deposil proleelion seheme exisls. 
IRELAND 1989 Compulsory < lrish Pounds 5.000 (80%) 
5.000 lo 10.000 (70%) 
10.000 lo 50.000 (50%) 
Maximun I.Pounds 10.000 
12,440 
ITALY 1989 Volunlary < Lira 200 M 
following 800 M 
(100%) 
( 80%) 
Max. eoverage Lira 800 M 394,623 
LUXEMBOURG 1989 Vo1unlary	 500.000 LF 12,923 
NETHERLANDS 1979 Compulsory	 40.000 FLH 18,991 
PORTUGAL 1992 Compulsory	 < Ese 1,5 M (80%) 10,784 
\,5 lo 13 M (60%) 
Max. eoverage Ese 2,1 M 
SPAIN 1977 Vo1untary	 1.500.000 Pesetas 9,158 
UNITED 1982 Compulsory Slerling Pounds 20.000 (75%) 18,660 
KINGDON Max. eoverage Lb. 15.000 
Souree: OCDE. Prudenlial Supervision in Banking; Sehoenmaker,D. (1992a) p.16. 
Two basic forms in the limits of deposit coverage can be found in the different countries, with 
the following characteristics: 
- Maximum limit: AH deposits (Finland); a percentage of the entity' s resources (Germany), or a given 
quantity (for the rest of the countries). 
- Partial refund of aH deposits (coinsurance). Depositors, anyone with whatever volume of deposits 
will experience a part of the loss in the event of bankruptcy of the entity (Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
the United Kingdom). 
AH systems cover both resideht and nonresident deposits, although differences exist in the 
extent of the coverage (deposits in foreign currency, deposits in branches of foreign banks and 
deposits in foreign branches of national banks) in addition to the financing of the system and the 
performance -previous or foHowing the liquidation- on the part of the deposit insurance fundo 
[Here Chart 2] 
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Annex lb
 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes in the EU
 
Counlry Coverage of prolectionexlended lo: Funding Preventive 
Contribulion or Aelion by Dep.I 
Deposils Deposils DeposilS al . Commilmenl lo Seheme prior lo 
in foreign al branehes . branehes pay Liquidalion 
eurreney of foreign of domeslie 
banlcs· banks abroad 
AUSTRIA Ves Ves No No No 
BELGIUM No Ves No (1) Ves Ves 
DENMARK Ves Ves No (1) No 
FINLAND Ves Ves No Ves Ves 
FRANCE No Ves No No Ves 
GERMANY Ves Ves Ves Ves Ves 
GREECE Al lhe momenl no deposil proleelion seheme exisls.
 
IRELAND (2) Ves No Ves Ves
 
ITALY Ves Ves Ves No Ves
 
LUXEMBOURG Ves Ves No No No
 
NETHERLANDS Ves Ves No No No
 
PORTUGAL Ves Ves No Ves Ves
 
SPAIN Ves Ves No Ves Ves
 
UNITED No Ves No Ves No
 
KINGDON
 
Souree: OCDE. Prudential Supervision in Banking; Sehocnmaker,D. (l992a) p.16.
 
(1) Ves, if no compulsory deposil proleelion scheme exisls in lhe hosl eountry. 
(2) Provisional coverage lo sorne eXlenl 10 olher currencies. 
S. Conclusions 
Belonging or not to an obligatory system, the establishment of maximum protection for savers 
and minimal for aH the MS plus the "subsidiarity principIe" are the main aspects which most clearly 
have solved the harmonisation of DI in the EU in accordance with the general consensus of what must 
be a system of efficient DI. The different treatment given to the branches and subsidiaries can be, 
nevertheless, a distortive factor for competition giving credit entities the choice ofthose organizational 
structures that provide them with greater competitive advantages. EquaHy, the treatment of the 
"moment" in which the system must act, is another factor of distortion for competition between the 
different entities. Taking action previously to liquidation would give the system more stability than 
will be performance "ex-post", aboye aH when what is intended in first place is the continuation of 
the financial entity, which in turn would avoid the "systemic" effect amongst savers. 
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Amongst the non-harmonised aspects there are two of vital importance: the financing of the 
system -public or private- and the amount of the contributive system -fixed or variable- which are the 
subject of discussion in different countries and EU regulators. The presence of the State in the 
operation mechanisms ofthe financial system means a competitive advantage for those MS with public 
systems given the additional guarantee that this implies, as we11 as a financing of DI in accordance 
with the degree of risk assumed by the credit entities that belongs to the same, which in turn reduces 
the moral-hazard problems associated with a11 kinds of insurance systems. 
Notes 
(1) Nevenheless, the systems based on private insurance are not exempt from difficulties given the 
characteristics of the banking activity, amongst others: i) to find adequate organizations that will evaluate the 
risk level of the assured; ii) the detemlÍnation of the premium to provide for the system and; (iii) the 
detenllination of the banking risk in as much as this is atypical within the very actuarial calculations of the 
insurance agencies. 
(2) The detemlination of the minimal standard level to hamlOnise amongst European countries was solved 
averaging the existing levels in the same (the countries with high protection levels such as Gemlany and Italy 
were excluded). In spite of the fact that the average was about 22.000 Ecus, it can be deducted that it was not 
the ConmIission's idea to even out the protection of the deposits between the conmlUnity countries and other 
countries, as in the US (78.200 Ecus) and Japan (60.400 Ecus) [Schoenmaker, 1992b:9]. 
(3) Published on 31 May, 1994 in the Official Daily of the European ConmlUnities. 
(4) [McKenzie et al., 1994:177] One ofthe Gemlan system's weakllesses is that the insurer intervenes in the 
event of insolvency, not of non-liquidity, so "total coverage" is apparent, since the iIlSolvency is superior to the 
non-liquidity, and it is very probable that, at the moment of intervention, the bank's value descends to levels 
which may be seen as minimal coverage. The contribution of resources to foml a deposit insurance fund counts 
on the "apparent" advantage of having inmlediate access to resources in the event of a crisis, however, the 
Spanish experience shows how the aboye mentioned fund was insufficient, and had to be supported by the 
issuing Bank. 
(5) Principally when the existing deposit guarantee systems between home and host country are quite different. 
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